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Liability for Environmental Harm and
Emerging Global Environmental Law
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL†
_______________________

Globalization is affecting law and legal systems throughout the
world in profound new ways. With the growth of global concern for
the environment, nations are transplanting environmental law and
policy innovations even from countries with very different legal and
cultural traditions. Private actors and nongovernmental organizations
are driving the development of new legal and nonlegal strategies to
protect the environment. These developments are blurring lines that
traditionally separated conceptions of domestic and international law
and public and private law. This is leading to the emergence of what I
have called ―global environmental law.‖1
One of the areas in which the concept of global environmental law
can enhance understanding of contemporary legal evolution is the
long struggle to develop standards of liability for global
environmental harm. The scant progress that has been made in
developing tort remedies in international law demonstrates the
limitations of relying on public international law that primarily
governs relations between states when seeking to regulate private
† Robert F. Stanton Professor of Law and Director, Environmental Law
Program, University of Maryland School of Law. This Article is based on remarks
delivered at Multilateralism and Global Law: Evolving Conceptions of
International Law and Governance at the University of Maryland School of Law
(Oct. 23, 2009) and at the Seventh Annual Colloquium of the IUCN Academy of
Environmental Law at Wuhan University in Wuhan, China (Nov. 2, 2009).
1. See Robert V. Percival, The Globalization of Environmental Law, 26 PACE
ENVTL L. REV. 451 (2009); Tseming Yang & Robert V. Percival, The Emergence
of Global Environmental Law, 36 ECOLOGY L.Q. 615 (2009).
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activities that cause environmental harm. For centuries, legal systems
around the world have acknowledged the principle that those who
cause significant, foreseeable harm to others should be held liable for
the damage they cause victims of this harm. The sic utere principle of
ancient Roman law and the ―polluter pays‖ principle are now
enshrined as universal elements of international environmental law,
as recognized in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration2 and the 1992 Rio
Declaration.3 While the nations of the world have pledged to develop
liability standards to implement these principles,4 effective global
liability rules ―are the Yeti of international environmental law—
pursued for years, sometimes spotted in rough outlines, but
remarkably elusive in practice.‖5 More than a dozen civil liability
treaties governing transnational environmental harm have been
negotiated but most remain ―unadopted orphans in international
environmental law.‖6
This Article begins by reviewing the historical development of
liability standards for environmental harm and their haphazard
incorporation into public international law. It then discusses the
obstacles that have made it difficult for victims of environmental
harm to hold polluters liable even under domestic law. The Article
then explores efforts to overcome these obstacles and the growth of
private transnational litigation to recover for environmental harm. It
concludes by arguing that the rise of global environmental law that
includes ―bottom up‖ and private initiatives has become an important
complement to traditional ―top down‖ efforts to develop international
liability norms. As countries strengthen their own domestic liability
standards to redress environmental harm, two issues will become
2. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, Swed.,
June 5–16, 1972, Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, prin. 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14/Rev. 1 (June 16, 1972), reprinted
in 11 I.L.M. 1416 (1972) [hereinafter Stockholm Declaration], available at
http://www.unep.org/Law/PDF/Stockholm_Declaration.pdf.
3. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de
Janeiro, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and
Development, princs. 2, 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Aug. 12, 1992), reprinted
in 33 I.L.M. 874 (1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration], available at
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/conf151/aconf15126-1annex1.htm.
4. See Stockholm Declaration, supra note 2, prin. 22; Rio Declaration, supra
note 3, prin. 13.
5. Noah Sachs, Beyond the Liability Wall: Strengthening Tort Remedies in
International Environmental Law, 55 UCLA L. REV. 837, 839 (2008).
6. Id. at 837.
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increasingly important: states’ receptiveness to entertain lawsuits by
foreign plaintiffs and the development of reciprocity standards for the
recognition of foreign judgments. Transnational private litigation
ultimately will help provide further impetus for the development of
global liability norms for environmental harm that will become an
important part of the new architecture of global environmental law.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT
For centuries, common law courts have embraced the ancient
Roman law principle that no person has a right to cause significant,
foreseeable harm to others. Expressed in the ancient Latin maxim sic
utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, this principle was explained by Lord
Holt in 1704 in Tenant v. Goldwin as requiring that ―every man must
so use his own as not to damnify another.‖7 A century and a half later,
British courts addressed the question whether a violation of existing
regulatory standards was a necessary precondition for tort liability.
After briefly holding in Hole v. Barlow8 that compliance with
existing regulatory standards could insulate an activity from tort
liability, the British courts in Bamford v. Turnley9 overruled Hole and
held that proof of pre-existing violations of regulatory standards was
not a precondition for tort liability.
The sic utere principle was recognized in an important
international arbitration that has become one of the few precedents
for international environmental law. In the Trail Smelter case,10
farmers in Washington state, beginning in 1926, sought to hold liable
the owners of a smelter across the Canadian border whose pollution
had destroyed their crops. Because Washington state courts could not
obtain jurisdiction over the Canadian smelter, the farmers asked the
U.S. State Department to pursue relief for them pursuant to the
Boundary Waters Treaty11 that provided for arbitration of disputes
between the U.S. and Canada. After more than a decade of
proceedings, an arbitral panel awarded damages to the farmers, based
in large part on the U.S. Supreme Court’s prior recognition of the sic
utere principle in domestic transboundary pollution disputes between
7. Tenant v. Goldwin, (1704) 92 Eng. Rep. 222, 224 (K.B.).
8. (1858) 140 Eng. Rep. 1113, 1114 (C.P.D).
9. (1862) 122 Eng. Rep. 27 (K.B.).
10. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938 (1941).
11. Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to Boundary
Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.–Gr. Brit. (for Can.), Jan. 11,
1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [hereinafter Boundary Waters Treaty].
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states.12 The arbitral tribunal declared that ―no State has the right to
use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause
injury by fumes in or to the territory of another or the properties or
person therein, when the case is of serious consequence and the
injury is established by clear and convincing evidence.‖13
In 1972 representatives from 113 nations gathered in Stockholm
for the first global environmental summit—the United Nations
Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm Conference). At
the Stockholm Conference they embraced the sic utere principle in
the first declaration of principles of global environmental law.
Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration states that:
States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United
Nations and the principles of international law, the sovereign
right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that
activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond
the limits of national jurisdiction.14
The Stockholm Declaration also urged the development of
principles of liability for global environmental harm. Principle 22 of
the Stockholm Declaration asserts that ―[s]tates shall cooperate to
develop further the international law regarding liability and
compensation for the victims of pollution and other environmental
damage caused by activities within the jurisdiction or control of such
States to areas beyond their jurisdiction.‖15
In the intervening decades, scant progress has been made in
implementing this promise. As Lakshman Guruswamy notes, ―thus
far it does not appear that states are willing to engage in the delicate
process of defining the conditions and scope of international
responsibility for environmental damage.‖16 The concept of state
responsibility for environmental harm has been included in the Third
12. See Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
13. Trail Smelter Case, 3 R.I.A.A. at 1965. The requirement of serious harm
shown by clear and convincing evidence derived from the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Missouri v. Illinois, 200 U.S. 496 (1906).
14. Stockholm Declaration, supra note 2, prin. 21.
15. Id. prin. 22.
16. LAKSHMAN D. GURUSWAMY ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND WORLD ORDER: A PROBLEM-ORIENTED COURSEBOOK 327 (1994).
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Restatement of Foreign Relations, which describes it as ―rooted in
customary international law,‖17 but scant progress has been made in
implementing it in practice.
In 1992, twenty years after the Stockholm Conference, the 172
governments participating in the Rio ―Earth Summit‖ pledged to
work harder to develop global norms of state responsibility for
environmental harm. Thus, Principle 13 of the Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development declares:
States shall develop national law regarding liability and
compensation for the victims of pollution and other
environmental damage. States shall also cooperate in an
expeditious and more determined manner to develop further
international law regarding liability and compensation for
adverse effects of environmental damage caused by activities
within their jurisdiction or control to areas beyond their
jurisdiction.18
Despite efforts by the International Law Commission,19 little
further progress has been made in the subsequent decades on
developing principles of state responsibility for environmental harm.
Several treaties have provisions that incorporate the sic utere
principle, but there is no consensus concerning how it should be
applied. More than a dozen multilateral agreements have been
adopted to address global environmental problems.20 Yet only five of
17. For a description of when state responsibility may be invoked, see
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 601, 602 (1987).
18. Rio Declaration, supra note 3, prin. 13.
19. See Protocol on Civil Liability and Compensation for Damage Caused by
the Transboundary Effects of Industrial Accidents on Transboundary Waters to the
1992 Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and
International Lakes and to the 1992 Convention on the Transboundary Effects of
Industrial Accidents, May 21, 2003, U.N. Doc. MP/WAT/2003/1,
CP.TEIA/2003/3, available at http://www.unece.org/env/civil-liability/documents/
protocol_e.pdf; Directive 2004/35/CE of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 21 April 2004 on Environmental Liability With Regard to the
Prevention and Remedying of Environmental Damage, 2004 O.J. (L 143) 56,
available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:3200
4L0035:EN:NOT; UN International Law Commission, 56th Sess., May 3–4 & July
5–Aug. 6, 2004, Report of the International Law Commission—Draft Principles on
Environmental Liability, para. 175, U.N. Doc. A/59/10, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/2004/2004report.htm.
20. These include: the Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy, the Convention on Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships, the
IAEA Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage, the Convention
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these have entered into force21 and all of these address liability for
either oil spills or nuclear accidents. The classic illustration of the
inadequacy of existing international law on state responsibility for
transboundary environmental harm is the fact that no nation asserted
any liability claims for the April 1986 nuclear accident in Chernobyl,
the worst such accident in history.22
II. ENVIRONMENTAL
CONUNDRUM‖

LIABILITY

AND

―THE

CAUSATION

Most developed countries now rely on comprehensive regulatory
systems in recognition of the limitations of tort liability as a vehicle
for controlling environmental risks. In situations where large, single
sources of pollutants, such as smelters, caused visible environmental
damage, the common law tort of nuisance could provide some
measure of redress to plaintiffs. But in a modern world awash in
pollutants from multiple sources, the difficulty of proving causal
injury has made common law liability too crude a vehicle to
compensate those exposed to environmental hazards. To be sure,
when a particular toxic substance, such as asbestos, causes ―signature
on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage Resulting From the Exploration for and
Exploitation of Seabed Resources, the UNECE Convention on Civil Liability for
Damage Caused During Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland
Navigation Vessels, the International Maritime Organization Convention on Civil
Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, the International Convention on the
Establishment of an International Fund for Oil Pollution Damage, Council of
Europe Lugano Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from
Activities Dangerous to the Environment, the International Maritime Organization
Convention on Liability and Compensation in Connection with Carriage of
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, the Basel Protocol on Liability and
Compensation for Damage Resulting from Transboundary Movement of Hazardous
Wastes, the International Maritime Organization Convention on Civil Liability for
Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, and the UNECE Protocol on Civil Liability and
Compensation for Damage Caused by the Transboundary Effects of Industrial
Accidents on Transboundary Waters. Sachs, supra note 5, at 854–57.
21. These are the: Paris Convention on Third Party Liability in the Field of
Nuclear Energy, IAEA Vienna Convention on Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage,
International Maritime Organization Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution
Damage, International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund
for Oil Pollution Damage, IMO International Maritime Organization Convention
on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage. Id.
22. See EDITH BROWN WEISS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY 419–423 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that the Chernobyl accident contributed
to the adoption of the Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident,
Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M. 1391 (1986) and the Convention on Assistance in the
Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency, Sept. 26, 1986, 25 I.L.M.
1377 (1986)).
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injuries‖ uniquely tied to exposure to it, the ―causation conundrum‖
can be overcome. Yet even in the case of asbestos, because exposure
to this deadly substance caused fatal diseases with a long latency
period, liability was imposed only decades after exposure to the
products containing it.23
Some countries have adopted liability standards for environmental
harm that shift or relax the burden of proving causal injury. These
efforts recognize the difficulty of satisfying individualized causation
standards when large populations are exposed to an environmental
hazard. Scientists can estimate how many people are likely to be
harmed by such exposures, even if they cannot identify which
particular individuals who have a disease have it as a result of the
exposure.
In the United States, the ―Superfund‖ legislation holds broad
classes of parties associated with the generation and disposal of toxic
substances strictly and jointly and severally liable for the costs of
remediating releases of them, but it does not provide compensation
for the victims of such releases.24 A creative effort to relax causation
standards in order to compensate those exposed to radiation from
atmospheric nuclear testing by the U.S. government during the 1950s
and 1960s was reversed on sovereign immunity grounds.25 Congress
responded to this decision by creating a program of administrative
compensation to permit certain classes of people who were exposed
to radiation from nuclear testing to recover modest amounts.26
While individual smokers repeatedly failed to win lawsuits against
manufacturers of tobacco products, the industry’s fortunes turned
23. See David Rosenberg, The Dusting of America: A Story of Asbestos—
Carnage, Cover-up and Litigation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1695 (1986) (reviewing
PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL
(1985)). Rosenberg notes that the history of the asbestos litigation demonstrates
that ―the tort system emerged as the uniquely effective and indispensable means of
exposing and defeating the asbestos conspiracy . . . if left to other devices, the
asbestos conspiracy would have been buried along with its victims.‖ Id.
24. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–75 (2006). The word ―compensation‖ was
incorporated in the name of the statute before an amendment deleted an
administrative compensation scheme from it.
25. See Allen v. United States, 816 F.2d 1417, 1424 (10th Cir. 1987).
26. See Veterans Dioxin and Radiation Exposure Compensation Standards Act,
Pub. L. No. 98-542, 98 Stat. 2725 (1984) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 1154); Radiation
Exposure Compensation Act, Pub. L. No. 101-426, 104 Stat. 920 (1990) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 2210).
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when state attorneys general adopted a concerted strategy to hold the
companies liable for the increased health costs states incurred due to
the use of tobacco products. In 1998, state attorneys general reached
a master settlement agreement in which the tobacco companies
agreed to pay $206 billion over twenty-five years to compensate the
states for increased health costs caused by tobacco-related diseases.
This settlement attracted the attention of foreign governments eager
to recover for similar costs incurred due to the export of tobacco
products.
Other nations also have made efforts to overcome the causation
conundrum in environmental cases. Chinese law purports to shift the
burden of proof to polluters to disprove causation in certain
circumstances. Once plaintiffs have demonstrated that they have
suffered harm associated with exposure to environmental pollutants,
China’s Civil Code authorizes shifting the burden to defendants to
disprove that their discharges of these pollutants caused the harm.27 In
April 2009, China’s Supreme People’s Court awarded damages
against a textile mill for harm to a fish farm that occurred in 1994
because the textile mill could not disprove that its discharges were
the source of the harm.28
Japan has amended its tort law to make it easier for victims of
environmental harm to recover compensation. When residents of the
fishing village of Minamata suffered severe mercury poisoning
beginning in the mid-1950s, the Chisso Chemical Company contested
27. See Some Provisions of the Supreme People’s Court on Evidence in Civil
Procedures, art. 4 (promulgated by the Judicial Committee of the Sup. People’s Ct.,
Dec. 6, 2001, effective Apr. 1, 2002) LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 16, 2010)
(P.R.C.). Burden-shifting provisions also are contained in article 86 of China’s
Solid Waste Pollution Control Law and article 87 of its Water Pollution Control
Law. See Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of
Environmental Pollution by Solid Wastes, art. 86 (promulgated by the Standing
Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Dec. 29, 2004, effective Apr. 1, 2005)
LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 16, 2010) (P.R.C.); Law of the People’s
Republic of China on the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, art. 87
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. People’s Cong., Feb. 28, 2008, effective June
1, 2008), LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Mar. 16, 2010) (P.R.C.). These were
invoked to shift the burden of proof and hold the Rongping Chemical Plant strictly
liable for pollution. See Zhang Changjian et al. v. Rongping Chemical Plant (on file
with author).
28. Zhejiang Province Pinghu Normal Special Species Farm v. Jiaxing Buyun
Dying and Chemical Factory, Supreme People's Court of the People's Republic of
China, Civil Judgment No. 5 [2006] of the Retrial Instance of the Second Division,
Apr. 2, 2009 (on file with author).
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claims that its waste disposal practices had caused the harm, but it did
not cease dumping mercury into Minamata Bay until 1968. After a
lengthy legal battle extending over decades, Chisso was held liable in
March 1973 for dumping toxic chemicals during the period 1932–68
that caused the ―Minamata disease‖ despite its claim that its
discharges had complied with all applicable laws and regulations.29
The Minamata tragedy helped spur the development of new laws in
Japan to provide compensation to victims of environmental harm. In
1969, the Law Concerning Special Measures for the Relief of
Pollution-Related Health Damage was adopted.30 This law authorized
the designation of certain geographical areas as polluted areas, and it
mandated that the government provide health benefits to residents
certified as having pollution-induced health damage.
In 1969, victims of air pollution filed the Yokkaichi Air Pollution
Lawsuit. Three years later, in 1972, the plaintiffs in this case
prevailed,31 which helped spur enactment of the so-called Absolute
Liability Law.32 The following year, the Pollution-Related Health
Damage Compensation Law was enacted.33 This law provides
government living assistance to pollution victims in addition to
compensation for the medical costs of victims, which is funded by
emissions charges on polluters.
Certified pollution victims filed several air pollution lawsuits
between 1977 and 1983. After revisions were made to Japan’s Health
Compensation Law, in 1989 the Japanese environmental agency
canceled the designations of pollution areas and stopped certifying
victims. In response to these changes in the law, new lawsuits were
29. See Watanabe v. Chisso K. K., 696 HANJI 15 (Kumamoto Dist. Ct., Mar. 20,
1973).
30. Kogai ni kakaru kenkō higai no kyusai ni kansuru tokubetsu sochi hō [Law
Concerning Special Measures for the Relief of Pollution-Related Health Damage],
Law No. 90 of 1969 (Japan).
31. See Shiono v. Shōwa Yokkaichi Sekiyu, 672 HANJI 30 (Tsu D. Ct.,
Yokkaichi Branch, July 24, 1972).
32. In June 1972, Japan enacted article 25 to its Air Pollution Control Law and
article 19 to its Water Pollution Control Law, which provides for absolute liability
whenever any air pollutant or water pollutant injures human life or health. See Taiki
osen bōshi hō [Air Pollution Control Law], Law No. 97 of 1968, art. 25 (Japan),
translated at http://www.asianlii.org/jp/legis/laws/apcl273/; Suisbitsu odaku bōshi
hō [Water Pollution Control Law], Law No. 138 of 1970, art. 19 (Japan), translated
at http://www.asianlii.org/jp/legis/laws/wpcl310/.
33. Kōgai kenkō higai no hoshō tō ni kansuru hōritsu [Pollution-Related Health
Damage Compensation Law], Law No. 111 of 1973 (Japan).
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filed by pollution victims in 1988 and 1989.
Efforts to compensate pollution victims also occurred at the local
level. Twelve local governments, including Tokyo and Osaka,
established their own systems to pay medical care expenses and
compensate more than 76,000 certified victims. In 1988, victims of
air pollution from a steel mill won their Chiba Kawasaki Steel
lawsuit.34 Other plaintiffs were victorious in subsequent lawsuits. In
March 1991, plaintiffs in the first Osaka Nishiyodogawa lawsuit
prevailed, which precipitated a favorable settlement for them in
March 1995.35 In July 1995, plaintiffs won the second, third, and
fourth Nishiyodogawa lawsuits, holding both the national
government and the expressway corporation liable for harm caused
by air pollution.36
After prevailing in lawsuits against steel companies, Japanese
plaintiffs turned to pollution from automobiles. In August 1998, the
Kawasaki Pollution decision recognized health damage caused by
automobile pollution and the right of victims of such pollution to
recover compensation.37 This served as a precedent for the massive
Tokyo Air Pollution lawsuit that extended over the decade from 1996
to 2006.38 Six groups of asthma victims sued the Japanese
government, the Tokyo city government, and all seven major
Japanese automakers.39 An appellate court ultimately proposed a 1.2
billion yen settlement to provide compensation to 527 pollution
victims.40 Most of this settlement was to be paid by automobile
manufacturers. The settlement agreement was accepted on July 3,
2007.41

34. See Judgment of Nov. 17, 1988, Chiba [District Court] Hanji, Heisei 1 Nen
8 Gatsu 5 Nichi Go 161 (Japan) (Kawasaki Steel Company Case).
35. See Nakajima v. Japan, 1383 HANJI 22 (Osaka D. Ct., Mar. 29, 1991).
36. See Hamada v. Japan, 1538 HANJI 17 (Osaka D. Ct., July 5, 1995).
37. See Miyata v. Japan, 1658 HANJI 3 (Yokohama D. Ct., Kawasaki Branch,
Aug. 5, 1998).
38. See The Tokyo Air Pollution Lawsuit, 1885 HANJI 23 (Tokyo D. Ct., Oct.
29, 2002).
39. These include: Toyota, Isuzu, Mazda, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Nissan Diesel,
and Toyota subsidiary Hino Motors.
40. Yang & Percival, supra note 1, at 618 n.4 (internal citation omitted); Eri
Osaka, Reevaluating the Role of the Tort Liability System in Japan, 26 ARIZ. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 420–21 (2009).
41. Osaka, supra note 40, at 421.
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III. LIABILITY FOR TRANSBOUNDARY ENVIRONMENTAL HARM
Despite the Georgia v. Tennessee Copper42 and Trail Smelter43
precedents, successful tort recoveries for transboundary
environmental harm have been exceedingly rare. Yet as scientists
improve their ability to trace the long-range fate and transport of
pollutants, our awareness of the seriousness of transboundary
pollution problems has only increased. We now know that as much as
thirty percent of mercury pollution in the western U.S. originates in
Asia, primarily from emissions of coal-fired power plants in China.44
Yet it remains unlikely that common law liability can be used
effectively to redress such transboundary environmental harm.
Concern over global warming and climate change—perhaps the
most serious example of transboundary environmental harm—has
spurred litigation by state governments and private parties against
large sources of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. In 2004, eight
states and the city of New York filed federal and state common law
nuisance actions seeking to require utilities operating the largest U.S.
coal-fired power plants to reduce their GHG emissions. In 2005, a
federal trial court judge dismissed the litigation as a nonjusticiable
―political question.‖45 In September 2009 (after a lengthy delay
caused partly by the court awaiting the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Massachusetts v. EPA46 decision), the Second Circuit reversed the
district court’s decision.47 The court ruled that the case did not present
a nonjusticiable political question, that the plaintiffs had standing to
sue, and that the case was not preempted by the federal Clean Air
Act.48 Defendants in the litigation operate power plants that
contribute ten percent of U.S. GHG emissions.

42. 206 U.S. 230 (1907).
43. Trail Smelter Case (U.S. v. Can.), 3 R.I.A.A. 1938, 1938 (1941).
44. Matt Pottinger, Steve Stecklow & John J. Fialka, Invisible Export: A Hidden
Cost of China’s Growth—Mercury Migration, WALL ST. J., Dec. 17, 2004, at A1.
Chinese mercury emissions also have been blamed for half of Korea’s mercury
pollution. See China Blamed for Half of Korea’s Mercury Pollution, CHOSUN ILBO
(Seoul), Apr. 23, 2007, http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2007/04/23/2
007042361024.html.
45. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 406 F.Supp.2d 265 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
46. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
47. Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 582 F.3d 309 (2d Cir. 2009).
48. Pub. L. No. 88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 42 U.S.C.).
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In October 2009, a Fifth Circuit panel followed suit by reversing a
district court decision holding that climate change litigation raised a
nonjusticiable political question.49 The lawsuit, brought by victims of
Hurricane Katrina, alleges that oil companies’ emissions of GHGs
exacerbated the damage caused by the hurricane. On February 26,
2010, the Fifth Circuit vacated the panel decision and agreed to
rehear it en banc. The Ninth Circuit also is considering the same issue
in a lawsuit brought by residents of a small coastal village in Alaska
who are seeking $400 million to relocate their village to higher
ground due to sea level rise.50 The residents are seeking the damages
from twenty-four oil companies and power plants on the theory that
their emissions of GHGs are contributing to global warming that is
causing the sea to rise.51
While these early decisions suggest that trial courts are reluctant to
entertain litigation seeking to hold private parties liable for climate
change, eventually such a case may come to trial, though it may be
difficult for plaintiffs to prevail. The same global ―tragedy of the
commons‖ that is making it difficult for the nations of the world to
agree on a binding treaty to control GHG emissions also may account
for their general failure to agree on global liability standards for
environmental harm, as Noah Sachs has ably explained.52 As Thomas
Merrill has explored, in the context of bilateral transboundary
pollution problems, the interests of upwind and upstream source
states are quite different from the interests of downwind or
downstream victims of pollution. This reduces opportunities for
negotiated solutions that benefit both parties.53 Merrill suggests
adopting a ―reverse golden rule‖ approach that would hold states
49. Comer v. Murphy Oil, USA, 585 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2009).
50. Rachel D’Oro, Kivalina, Alaska: Eroding Village Appeals Lawsuit’s
Dismissal, Blames Corporations for Climate Change, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 28,
2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/29/kivalina-appeals-eroding-_n_441
420.html.
51. Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 663 F.Supp.2d 863 (N.D.
Cal. 2009) (The trial court dismissed the case as presenting a nonjusticiable
political question.).
52. Sachs, supra note 5, at 867–98 (describing the factors preventing agreement
on civil liability regimes for transboundary environmental harm as including
interest conflicts between developed states and developing states, high transaction
costs and low expected payoffs, and the stringent content of proposed liability
standards).
53. Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, 46 DUKE L.
J. 931, 935 (1997).
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affected by pollution to the same standards of liability to which they
hold their own domestic sources.54 Yet this concept has not been
incorporated in treaties to resolve transboundary conflicts between
nations because the countries have little incentive to agree to subject
themselves to new liability regimes.
IV. TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL TORT LITIGATION
Despite the failure of public international law to flesh out in any
detail state responsibility for transboundary environmental harm,
private parties have been aggressively pursuing transnational
environmental tort litigation.
In the new era of global environmental law, nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs) play a major role in exposing environmentally
damaging activities by multinational corporations even in the most
remote areas of the world.55 Greenpeace International, for example,
was among the first global NGOs to expose toxic waste dumping in
developing countries.56
When the regulatory system fails to prevent incidents of substantial
harm, victims may pursue private, transnational litigation. Now that
the U.S. Supreme Court has made it very difficult to use the Alien
Tort Claims Act to bring environmental lawsuits in the United
States,57 plaintiffs increasingly are suing multinationals in the country
where the harm occurs.
A. Forum Non Conveniens
In the absence of any global enforcement entity, difficult questions
are arising concerning the appropriate venues for seeking redress for
environmental harm caused by caused by multinational corporations.
54. Id. at 998.
55. Yang & Percival, supra note 1, at 634.
56. This is well illustrated by the saga of the Karin B, a ship that dumped toxic
waste from Italy on beach in Nigeria in 1988. After Greenpeace International
exposed the waste dumping, the Nigerian government threatened to imprison the
Italian ambassador and the waste was quickly retrieved by the dumpers. Steven
Greenhouse, Toxic Waste Boomerang: Ciao Italy!, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 1988,
http://www.nytimes.com/1988/09/03/world/toxic-waste-boomerang-ciaoitaly.html?pagewanted=1.
57. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (holding that for a case
to be brought under the Alien Tort Statute plaintiffs must establish that the
allegedly wrongful act violates the ―law of nations,‖ shorthand for universally
applicable principles of law at the time the statute was enacted by the First U.S.
Continental Congress).
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While U.S. companies initially argued that they should not be subject
to suit in the U.S. for harm caused abroad, they are now starting to
change their tune as lawsuits against them are progressing in other
venues (e.g., a lawsuit against Chevron for environmental harm from
oil drilling in the Oriente that is being heard in the Ecuadoran courts).
A key issue facing future courts will be standards domestic courts
should employ in enforcing liability judgments rendered against
multinational corporations by foreign courts.
Victims of environmental harm increasingly are turning to
transnational litigation to seek compensation for their injuries. In
addition to the usual difficulties of proving causation in toxic tort
cases, foreign plaintiffs face other formidable obstacles. American
courts often refuse to hear cases brought by plaintiffs injured in
foreign countries by invoking the doctrine of forum non conveniens,
as illustrated by the litigation over the Bhopal tragedy, which was
rejected by American courts.58 Because American tort law has been
perceived to be more generous to plaintiffs than the law in most
foreign countries,59 the choice of forum can have a substantial impact
on the amount of damages recoverable.
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Alfaro,60 banana workers in Costa Rica
claimed that they had been injured by a pesticide (1,2-Dibromo-3Chloropropane, or DBCP) that EPA had banned within the United
States but which continues to be produced in the United States for
export abroad.61 The workers brought a tort action in Texas state
court against the U.S. company that manufactured the pesticide. After
the trial court dismissed the action, the plaintiffs appealed to the
Texas Supreme Court. By a vote of 5-4, the court held that the case
must be heard in Texas. In a concurring opinion, Justice Doggett
58. In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984,
809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir. 1987). See Victoria Arthaud, Environmental Destruction in
the Amazon: Can U.S. Courts Provide a Forum for the Claims of Indigenous
Peoples?, 7 GEO. INT’L ENVTL L. REV. 195 (1994).
59. Russell J. Weintraub, International Litigation and Forum Non Conveniens,
29 TEX. INT’L L. J. 321, 352 (1994); Russell J. Weintraub, The United States As A
Magnet Forum and What, If Anything, To Do About It, in INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: THE REGULATION OF FORUM SELECTION 213 (Jack L. Goldsmith ed.,
1997).
60. 786 S.W.2d 674 (Tex. 1990).
61. The pesticide DBCP to which the plaintiffs were exposed had been banned
in the United States since 1977. For a history behind this ban, see DEVRA DAVIS,
WHEN SMOKE RAN LIKE WATER: TABLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DECEPTION AND
THE BATTLE AGAINST POLLUTION 195–200 (2002).
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argued that ―[c]omity is not achieved when the United States allows
its multinational corporations to adhere to a double standard when
operating abroad and subsequently refuses to hold them accountable
for those actions.‖62 Agreeing with the majority that Texas law did
not permit the case to be dismissed on forum non conveniens
grounds, he concluded that:
The doctrine of forum non conveniens is obsolete in a world in
which markets are global and in which ecologists have
documented the delicate balance of all life on this planet. The
parochial perspective embodied in the doctrine of forum non
conveniens enables corporations to evade legal control merely
because they are transnational. This perspective ignores the
reality that actions of our corporations affecting those abroad
will also affect Texans. Although DBCP is banned from use
within the United States, it and other similarly banned
chemicals have been consumed by Texans eating foods
imported from Costa Rica and elsewhere. In the absence of
meaningful tort liability in the United States for their actions,
some multinational corporations will continue to operate
without adequate regard for the human and environmental
costs of their actions. This result cannot be allowed to repeat
itself for decades to come.63
In the past, dismissals by U.S. courts on forum non conveniens
grounds usually spelled the end of efforts to hold a defendant liable.
One study concluded that fewer than four percent of cases dismissed
by American courts on this ground ever are litigated in foreign
courts.64 Even when cases dismissed by U.S. courts later were filed in
foreign jurisdictions, they rarely were successful in holding
defendants accountable for the full measure of the harm they
caused.65 At the time Alfaro was decided by the Supreme Court of
62. Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 687 (Doggett, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 689 (internal citations omitted).
64. David W. Robertson, Forum Non Conveniens in America and England: “A
Rather Fantastic Fiction”, 103 LAW Q. REV. 398, 419 (1987). In his concurring
opinion in Alfraro, Justice Doggett in a footnote cited Professor Robertson’s study,
noting that it had found that only one personal injury case out of fifty-five surveyed
and only two commercial cases out of thirty surveyed had reached trial overseas.
Alfaro, 786 S.W.2d at 683 n.5 (Doggett, J., concurring).
65. After the Bhopal litigation was rejected by courts in the United States, the
Supreme Court of India approved a settlement in 1989 that barred all actions
against Union Carbide, the owner of the plant involved in the Bhopal tragedy, in
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Texas, Costa Rican law would have limited the plaintiffs’ recoveries
to no more than $1,500 each.66 Because the case could be tried in
Texas, the eighty-two plaintiffs and their wives ultimately received a
settlement worth nearly $20 million, shortly before the case was
scheduled to go to trial in 1992.67 One factor leading to the settlement
was the plaintiffs’ concern that the Texas legislature would adopt
legislation reversing the Alfaro holding. In February 1993, the Texas
legislature passed legislation reinstating the forum non conveniens
doctrine effective September 1, 1993.68
The Alfaro case was not the end of tort suits against U.S. chemical
companies by foreign banana workers exposed to DBCP. In May
1997, Shell, Dow Chemical Co., and Occidental Chemical Corp.
settled a class action filed on behalf of 13,000 banana workers in the
Philippines, Honduras, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Guatemala, and Costa
Rica who allegedly became sterile or suffered other health problems
as a result of exposure to DBCP.69 Although the companies
maintained that any harm to the workers was caused by misuse of the
pesticide, they agreed to create a $41.5 million fund to compensate
the workers.70 The first payments from the fund were received by the
workers in December 1997.71 Workers who suffered health problems
return for a payment of $470 million to compensate the victims. Efforts to overturn
the settlement have not been successful. More than 3,000 people were killed and
more than 100,000 were injured by the gas leak. See Suketu Mehta, A Cloud Still
Hangs Over Bhopal, N.Y. Times, Dec. 3, 2009, at A43, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/03/opinion/03mehta.html;
Rhys
Blakely,
Activists Mark Bhopal Anniversary With Renewed Call for Justice, TIMESONLINE,
Dec. 3, 2009, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6942219.
ece.
66. Developments in the Law—International Environmental Law, 104 HARV. L.
REV. 1484, 1618 (1991).
67. Davis, supra note 61, at 200. The Alfaro decision may have opened the door
to similar lawsuits on behalf of foreigners allegedly injured by U.S. corporations. In
October 1991, a toxic tort suit was filed against a company in Brownsville, Texas
on behalf of a group of more than sixty Mexican children who are deformed or
retarded. John M. McClintock, In Matamoros, Residents’ Rage at Polluting U.S.Owned Companies Is Growing, BALTIMORE SUN, Jan. 19, 1992, at A8, available at
http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-01-19/news/1992019023_1_matamorosbirth-defects-mexicans.
68. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 71.051 (Vernon 2010); 1993 TEX.
SESS. LAW SERV. ch. 4 (S.B. 2) (West 2008).
69. See Rick Kennedy, Fruit of the Poison Tree: In a Dallas Court, Costa Rican
Banana Workers Claim a Banana Pesticide Left Them Sterile, DALLAS OBSERVER,
Mar. 10, 2005, http://www.dallasobserver.com/content/printVersion/285584.
70. Id.
71. Filipino Workers Receive Compensation from Banana Pesticide Settlement
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received between $800 and $5,000, depending on the seriousness of
their problems. Workers unable to document health problems but
who could show they were exposed to DBCP were to receive $100
each. While these payments are small by U.S. standards, the average
daily wage of a Filipino banana worker was approximately $4.60 at
the time.72
For nearly two decades, residents of the Oriente region of Ecuador
have been suing Texaco and its successor corporation Chevron
seeking compensation for, and remediation of, severe pollution from
oil drilling operations that occurred during the 1970s. Texaco initially
persuaded a federal trial court in New York to dismiss the litigation
on the ground of forum non conveniens. But in Jota v. Texaco, Inc.,73
the Second Circuit reversed this dismissal. The court held that the
district court should not have used the doctrine of forum non
conveniens to dismiss the case without at least requiring the company
to submit to Ecuador’s jurisdiction. In subsequent litigation, the court
affirmed the dismissal of the suit only on the condition that Texaco
submit to the jurisdiction of the Ecuadoran courts.74
B. Establishing a Violation of “the Law of Nations” Under the
Alien Tort Statute
The Ecuador oil pollution litigation and several other lawsuits have
been brought by aliens in federal court against U.S. corporations
under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS). The ATS, which was adopted as
part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, gives federal courts jurisdiction to
hear a civil action by ―an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.‖75 In Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc.,76 Tom Beanal, the leader of the Amungme
Tribal Council of Lambaga Adat Suki Amungme, sued U.S. mining
companies that operated an open pit copper, gold, and silver mine in
Indonesia. Bringing his suit in federal district court in Louisiana
pursuant to the ATS, Beanal alleged that the companies had caused
great harm to him and the members of his tribe by discharging
100,000 tons of tailings per day in several rivers, rendering them
Fund, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 1997, at B9C.
72. Id.
73. 157 F.3d 153 (2d Cir. 1998).
74. Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 303 F.3d 470 (2d Cir. 2002).
75. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2008).
76. 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
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unusable for bathing and drinking.77
After his claims were dismissed by the trial court,78 Beanal
appealed. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
the dismissal of Beanal’s claims. It held that his complaint failed to
allege facts that would constitute a violation of the ―law of nations,‖
as required by the ATS.79 The court held that the ATS ―applies only
to shockingly egregious violations of universally recognized
principles of international law.‖80 The court stated that the Rio
Declaration and other sources of international environmental law
―merely refer to a general sense of environmental responsibility‖ and
―abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable
standards and regulations to identify practices that constitute
international environmental abuses or torts.‖81 The court also found
persuasive ―the argument to abstain from interfering in a sovereign’s
environmental practices . . . especially when the alleged
environmental torts and abuses occur within the sovereign’s borders
and do not affect neighboring countries.‖82
In Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.,83 the Second Circuit
affirmed the dismissal of another ATS lawsuit brought by residents of
Peru against a U.S. company operating a copper smelter in their
neighborhood. The court held that the plaintiffs’ allegations that
uncontrolled emissions from the smelter injured their health and
threatened their lives did not rise to the level of a violation of the
―law of nations‖ as required to state a case under the ATS because it
involved only ―intranational pollution.‖84
By setting such a high bar for establishing a violation of the ―law
of nations,‖ these decisions foreshadowed the U.S. Supreme Court’s
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain85 decision. In Sosa, the Court held that the
77. Id. at 163, 166.
78. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 969 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. La. 1997).
79. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 167.
80. Id. (quoting Zapata v. Quinn, 707 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1983)) (per
curiam).
81. Beanal, 197 F.3d at 167.
82. Id. For a discussion of the history of the Alien Tort Claims Act and efforts
to apply it to remedy environmental abuses, see Richard L. Herz, Litigating
Environmental Abuses Under the Alien Tort Claims Act: A Practical Assessment,
40 VA. J. INT’L L. 545 (2000).
83. 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003).
84. Id. at 253–59.
85. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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ATS can be used only to seek redress for actions that violate
―specific, universal, and obligatory‖ norms recognized as part of the
―law of nations‖ at the time the law was enacted.86 While some
observers believe that Sosa effectively gutted the ATS, at least as a
vehicle for redressing global environmental harm, others believe that
it still provides an important avenue for redress when environmental
harm is coupled with egregious human rights violations.87
The latter view acquired some force as plaintiffs in two post-Sosa
cases have recovered substantial settlements when human rights
abuses were coupled with environmental claims. In December 2004,
plaintiffs who claimed that the Unocal Corporation had colluded with
the Burmese military to use forced labor, murder, and rape in
connection with construction of an oil pipeline won a favorable
settlement in an ATS case. Filed as a class action four years earlier by
fifteen Burmese villagers, the lawsuit alleged that the Unocal
Corporation should be held liable for forced labor, murder, rape, and
torture inflicted on natives of Burma by the country’s military in the
course of construction of an oil pipeline. After the district court
dismissed the lawsuits,88 the plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit.
A panel of the Ninth Circuit held in September 2002 that Unocal
could be found liable under the ATS for aiding and abetting the
military’s actions if the plaintiffs’ allegations were found to be true at
trial.89 In February 2003, the Ninth Circuit vacated the panel’s
decision and agreed to rehear the case en banc. 90 The case was argued
before the en banc court after Sosa was decided, and the U.S.
government supported dismissal of the lawsuits.91 However, after the
oral argument did not go well for Unocal, a settlement was reached. 92
While the terms of the settlement are confidential, Unocal announced
that it ―will compensate plaintiffs and provide funds enabling
86. Id. at 724–25, 732.
87. See GEORGE P. FLETCHER, TORT LIABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
175 (2008) (arguing that Sosa’s reference to ―specific, universal and obligatory‖
norms is ―not to be taken literally‖ and that ―with sufficient qualification and
explanation every norm in international law is sufficiently specific to warrant
liability‖).
88. Doe I v. Unocol Corp., 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000).
89. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002).
90. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
91. Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 403 F.3d 708 (9th Cir. 2005).
92. Unocal, 403 F.3d at 708. See Marc Lifhser, Unocal Settles Human Rights
Lawsuit Over Alleged Abuses at Myanmar Pipeline, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at
C1, available at http://articles.latimes.com/2005/mar/22/business/fi-unocal22.

PERCIVAL MACRO - 05-14-10 (DO NOT DELETE)

6/3/2010 1:42 PM

56

[Vol. 25:37

MARYLAND JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

plaintiffs and their representatives to develop programs to improve
living conditions, health care and education and protect the rights of
people from the pipeline region.‖93
Another ATS suit coupling environmental and human rights claims
was settled in June 2009 on the eve of trial. Survivors of Nigerian
environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa used the ATS to sue Royal
Dutch Shell for its alleged complicity in the Nigerian military’s
execution of Saro-Wiwa in 1995. In December 2008, Chevron had
won another high profile ATS case when a jury in San Francisco
ruled in Bowoto v. Chevron Corp. that the oil company was not
responsible for human rights abuses when the Nigerian military
suppressed an environmental protest against its drilling practices. 94
But Royal Dutch Shell settled the Saro-Wiwa case by agreeing to pay
$15.5 million to his survivors.95 The settlement was reached just as
the trial was about to commence after thirteen years of litigation.
Shell maintained that it had no involvement in the execution of SaraWiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders who had been protesting oil
pollution in the Niger Delta. It described the settlement as a
―humanitarian gesture.‖96 However, the settlement was widely
viewed as an effort to prevent embarrassing revelations at trial
concerning the company’s support for the Nigerian military’s
repressive tactics.
C. Prudential Standing
A more extreme obstacle to lawsuits in U.S. courts by foreigners to
recover for environmental harm is the notion that nonresident aliens
do not have prudential standing to sue. On June 20, 2001, the
International Labor Rights Fund, which represents eleven villagers
from Aceh, Indonesia, sued the Exxon/Mobil Corporation in federal
district court in Washington, D.C.97 The lawsuit seeks to hold
93. Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law—
Tentative Settlement of ATCA Human Rights Suits Against Unocal, 99 AM. J. INT’L
L. 479, 498 (2005) (quoting Press Release, Unocal Corp., Settlement Reached in
Human Rights Lawsuit, Dec. 13, 2004).
94. See Bowoto v. Chevron Corp., 557 F. Supp. 2d 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2008);
Verdict and Settlement Summary, Bowoto v. ChevronTexaco Corp., No. C 9902506 SI, 2008 WL 5483539 (N.D. Cal. filed Dec. 1, 2008).
95. Jad Mouawad, Shell to Pay $15.5 Million to Settle Nigerian Case, N.Y.
TIMES, June 9, 2009, at B1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/09/b
usiness/global/09shell.html.
96. Id.
97. See Doe v. ExxonMobil, No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C. July 29, 2002).
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ExxonMobil accountable for human rights abuses by Indonesian
soldiers guarding the company’s oil facilities in Indonesia. It alleges
that the company bought military equipment and paid mercenaries
who have assisted Indonesian security forces in efforts to crush
dissent by torturing and assaulting villagers. Exxon denies
responsibility for the behavior of the Indonesian military and says
that it condemns the violation of human rights in any form. In 2006,
the court refused to dismiss the case despite a State Department claim
that it could have a ―serious[ly] adverse impact on significant
interests of the United States, including interests related directly to
the ongoing struggle against international terrorism.‖98 However, in a
subsequent companion case assigned to the same judge, the court
dismissed similar claims by holding that nonresident aliens have no
standing to sue in U.S. courts.99 In his decision, Judge Royce
Lamberth recognized that there was no question that the Indonesian
plaintiffs had made sufficient allegations of harm to establish
standing under Article III of the Constitution.100 Noting that
―plaintiffs allege that members of the Indonesian military committed
the torts . . . during a period of martial law,‖ Judge Lamberth
concluded that he could ―see no reason to find that plaintiffs have
standing in this unique factual context.‖101
Similar decisions have kept foreign governments from pursuing
lawsuits to hold U.S. tobacco companies liable for the harm caused
by their products. While individuals frequently failed to win lawsuits
seeking to hold manufacturers of tobacco products liable for the
deadly diseases their products caused, in 1998 state attorneys general
forced the industry to agree to pay $206 billion over twenty-five
years to compensate the states for increased health costs caused by
tobacco-related diseases. While the same products presumably cause
the same harm outside of the U.S., to date no foreign plaintiff has
been successful in holding a U.S. tobacco company liable.

98. Letter of William H. Taft, IV, Legal Advisor, Dep’t of State, to Honorable
Louis F. Oberdorfer, submitted in Doe v. ExxonMobil, No. 01-CV-1357 (D.D.C.
July 29, 2002), at 1 (on file with the Maryland Journal of International Law). See
also Peter Waldman & Timothy Maples, A Global Journal Report: Administration
Sets New Hurdles for Human-Rights Cases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2002, at B1.
99. Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 658 F. Supp.2d 131 (D.D.C. 2009).
100. Id. at 134.
101. Id. at 135 (internal citations omitted).
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V. THE FOREIGN RESPONSE TO U.S. DISMISSALS
The increasing reluctance of U.S. courts to entertain transnational
tort litigation has spawned a backlash in some developing countries
where plaintiffs reside. Some countries have adopted statutes
designed to preclude forum non conveniens dismissals by U.S. courts
by providing that their own courts automatically lose jurisdiction to
hear a case once suit has been filed in a foreign court with
jurisdiction.102 A model law, drafted by the Latin American
Parliament (Parlatino) and widely adopted in Latin American
countries allows damages to be calculated under the law of the
foreign defendant’s country, eliminating the advantage to the
defendant of being liable for lesser amounts in the courts of
developing countries.103 These and other measures have significantly
altered the calculus that now confronts multinational corporations.
As noted above, when Texaco won dismissal of the ATS lawsuit
filed against it by residents of the Oriente region of Ecuador, it was
widely assumed that the company had escaped liability. Yet the case
was refiled in the courts of Ecuador where litigation has now been
under way for more than a decade. Eight years ago, Chevron acquired
Texaco and with it responsibility for defending the lawsuit. After
years of trial to assess responsibility for extensive environmental
damage in the Oriente, Chevron now is facing the prospect of an
adverse judgment potentially as large as $27 billion—the cost
estimate of a court-appointed expert for compensation and
remediation of the pollution.
Chevron’s defense is that everything it did in Ecuador was legal
and that it spent $40 million on environmental cleanup and was
released from further liability by the government of Ecuador in 1992
when Texaco left the country. The plaintiffs claim that this settlement
with a too-compliant government does not absolve Chevron of
responsibility for the harm its activities caused to the individual
plaintiffs in the lawsuit. While the litigation over environmental
devastation caused by oil production in Ecuador has been ongoing for
nearly two decades, the basic legal question at the heart of the
102. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Transnational Litigation and Institutional
Choice, 51 B.C. L. REV. (forthcoming Sept. 2010).
103. RONALD A. BRAND & SCOTT R. JABLONSKI, FORUM NON CONVENIENS:
HISTORY, GLOBAL PRACTICE, AND FUTURE UNDER THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS 132–33 (2007).
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controversy is remarkably simple: should governments be able to
insulate private companies from liability for acts that foreseeably
cause significant harm to others?
In July 2009, Chevron officials conceded that the company is
likely to lose the lawsuit and have an enormous judgment rendered
against it. The company vowed that it will not pay such a judgment
and that it will fight in the courts of both Ecuador and the U.S. for
decades if necessary. While some shareholders have urged the
company to settle, Chevron spokesperson Don Campbell told the
Wall Street Journal that ―[w]e’re not going to be bullied into a
settlement‖ because the company has done nothing wrong.104
What is particularly ironic about Chevron’s legal posture is that, if
the company had not fought having the case tried in U.S. courts under
the ATS, it is highly likely that it would have prevailed on the merits,
particularly in the wake of the Sosa decision. Chevron’s legal
strategy seems to have been driven by the assumption that the risk of
a foreign court effectively holding it liable was miniscule. Yet as
global environmental law flourishes, countries throughout the world
now are upgrading their judicial systems, making such assumptions
increasingly questionable.
In September 2009, Judge Juan Nuñez, the Ecuadoran judge
presiding over the trial, recused himself from the case after Chevron
released a video that the company claimed showed that the judge was
committed to ruling against the oil company.105 In the video, which
was posted on Chevron’s website, the judge reportedly refuses to
reveal the verdict several times but then responds ―yes, sir‖ to a
question Chevron claims was an inquiry as to whether Chevron will
lose the lawsuit.106 There also reportedly is a discussion of how
remediation funds Chevron would be ordered to pay will be spent and
a suggestion that some could be used to pay off government officials.
The video was covertly filmed by an Ecuadoran former contractor for
Chevron who the oil company claims was acting entirely
independently. While the judge claimed the video had been doctored
104. Ben Casselman, Chevron Expects to Fight Ecuador Lawsuit in U.S.—As
Largest Environmental Judgment on Record Looms, the Oil Company Reassures
Shareholders it Won’t Pay, WALL ST. J., July 20, 2009, at B3.
105. David R. Baker, Judge Recuses Himself in Suit Against Chevron, SAN
FRAN. CHRON., Sept. 5, 2009, http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-09-05/business/1720
5188_1_tapes-videos-case.
106. Id.
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and denied that he had prejudged the case, he was asked to recuse
himself by Washington Pezantes, the attorney general of Ecuador. 107
The quick recusal suggests that the Ecuadoran judiciary appreciates
the importance of the case and the likely battle that would follow
efforts to enforce any judgment against Chevron in the U.S. courts.
Judge Nicolás Zambrano will now preside over the case, which is
being heard in Lago Agrio, Ecuador.
On September 23, 2009, Chevron announced that it had filed an
international arbitration claim against the government of Ecuador in
the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague.108 Chevron bases its
claim on what it calls the Ecuadoran government’s ―exploitation‖ of
the lawsuit.109 Chevron is asking the tribunal to enforce its 1998
cleanup agreement with Petroecuador and a bilateral U.S.–Ecuador
investment treaty. While Chevron’s move was widely expected, most
observers thought it would not occur until after the litigation against
the company was concluded in the Ecuadoran courts.110 Chevron now
claims that it has no choice because ―Ecuador’s judicial system is
incapable
of
functioning
independently
of
political
influence.‖111 Ecuadoran attorney general Diego Garcia rejected
Chevron’s effort to impugn the integrity of the Ecuadoran judiciary
and noted that the plaintiffs in the lawsuit before the Ecuadoran court
are not parties to the arbitration proceeding Chevron has initiated in
the Hague.
As the Chevron litigation illustrates, a major issue likely to emerge
from this transnational litigation will be the standards for enforcing
foreign judgments in the face of charges that due process was not
afforded. This already has become an issue in subsequent DBCP
litigation in Nicaragua because of changes in procedures for proving
claims.
Nicaraguan courts had awarded more than $2.1 billion in damages
to plaintiffs, using Special Law 364 enacted in 2001 to make it easy
107. Mercedes Alvaro, Judge in Chevron Case Agrees to Step Aside, WALL ST.
J., Sept. 7, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125208172990086901.html.
108. Press Release, Chevron Corp., Chevron Files International Arbitration
Against the Government of Ecuador Over Violations of the United States-Ecuador
Bilateral Investment Treaty (Sept. 23, 2009), available at http://www.chevron.com/
news/press/release/?id=2009-09-23.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
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for plaintiffs to recover in DBCP cases. As described by Los Angeles
Superior Court Judge Victoria Chaney, under this law ―essentially
anyone who obtains two required lab reports stating he is sterile and
who claims to have been exposed to DBCP on a banana farm is
entitled to damages; causation and liability are conclusively
presumed . . . .‖112 Under special procedures prescribed by the law,
the defendant must post a $15 million bond and ―has just 3 days to
answer the complaint, the parties have 8 days to present evidence,
and the court has 3 days to issue a judgment.‖113
Judge Chaney dismissed DBCP lawsuits brought in Los Angeles
Superior Court against the Dole Food Company because of fraud
occurring in Nicaragua.114 The judge found the cases to be tainted by
pervasive fraud by lawyers and others in Nicaragua who recruited
plaintiffs who had never worked on banana plantations, falsified lab
reports, and sought to intimidate witnesses who helped expose the
fraud.115 In light of Judge Chaney’s conclusions concerning pervasive
fraud in Nicaragua, it is unlikely Nicaraguan DBCP judgments will
be enforced by U.S. courts. However, Judge Chaney did specifically
state that her conclusions applied only to cases involving Nicaraguan
plaintiffs and that no evidence of fraud has been presented involving
DBCP plaintiffs from any other country.116
In September 2009, the British oil trading firm Trafigura abruptly
offered to settle a $160 million class action brought in London on
behalf of 31,000 residents of the Ivory Coast allegedly harmed by the
company’s dumping of hundreds of tons of toxic waste in Abidjan in
August 2006. The company previously had been forced to clean up
the waste at a cost of $200 million, but thousands of Abidjan
residents claimed that exposure to the waste had caused severe health
problems and even some deaths. The case against Trafigura had been
scheduled to go to trial in Britain on October 6. Trafigura’s defense
112. Rudolfo Mejia v. Dole Food Company, Inc., No. BC340079, at 23 (Cal.
Super. Ct. June 17, 2009) (proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
supporting order terminating Mejia and Rivera cases for fraud on the court),
available at http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-Dole_Chan
ey_ruling.pdf.
113. Id.
114. Steve Stecklow, Fraud by Trial Lawyers Taints Wave of Pesticide
Lawsuits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2009, at A1, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125061508138340501.html.
115. Id.
116. Mejia, No. BC340079, at 24.
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was to blame the waste dumping on an ―independent contractor.‖ It
aggressively threatened to bring libel actions against media outlets
who published reports favorable to the claimants. Yet when the
Guardian newspaper revealed emails allegedly showing efforts by
Trafigura to cover up its involvement in the waste dumping,
Trafigura quickly announced that it had reached a nearly $50 million
settlement with attorneys for the plaintiffs.117 While attorneys for the
plaintiffs expressed approval of the settlement, Greenpeace argued
that the company still should be prosecuted for manslaughter for
deaths caused by the waste dumping.118
VI. CONCLUSION: ENVIRONMENTAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

LIABILITY

AND

GLOBAL

Three years ago, in an article forecasting the future of
environmental law, I predicted that as other nations upgrade their
judicial systems, U.S. corporations eventually would prefer to be
sued in U.S. courts rather than in foreign jurisdictions.119 The saga of
the Chevron litigation in Ecuador may confirm the accuracy of this
prediction much faster than anyone could have anticipated. This and
other transnational environmental litigation is part of the more
complex picture that has emerged concerning how global
environmental law is developing today. Efforts devoted to the ―top
down‖ approach of negotiating comprehensive, multilateral treaties
on state responsibility have yielded scant progress. However,
progress is being made in the development of environmental liability
norms from the ―bottom up.‖
NGOs and multinational corporations increasingly are fighting
battles over environmental liability in the court of global public
opinion. Even losing ATS cases have helped shine the glare of
international publicity on questionable environmental practices that
fall far short of what multinationals would use when operating in the
developed world. In the Ecuador litigation, both Chevron and the
plaintiffs are aggressively using all means available to influence
117. See David Leigh, How UK Oil Company Trafigura Tried to Cover Up
African Pollution Disaster, GUARDIAN, Sept. 16, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/
world/2009/sep/16/trafigura-african-pollution-disaster.
118. See David Leigh, Greenpeace Continues Trafigura Pursuit Over Toxic
Waste, GUARDIAN, Sept. 20, 2009, http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/sep/20/
greenpeace-trafigura-toxic-waste.
119. Robert V. Percival, Environmental Law in the Twenty-First Century, 25
VA. ENVTL L. J. 1, 32 (2007).
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public opinion.120 Even apart from any relief mandated by a court, this
litigation is likely to influence the development of norms for future
corporate behavior in the developing world.
Bilateral approaches to the development of liability standards also
are making some progress and much of it is occurring through the
actions of subnational units of government. Seven U.S. states and
three Canadian provinces have adopted the Uniform Transboundary
Pollution Reciprocal Access Act,121 which seeks to promote ―the
equalization of rights and remedies of citizens in Canada and the
U.S.A. affected by pollution emanating from the other
jurisdiction.‖122
Both the Chevron litigation in Ecuador and the Central American
DBCP litigation are likely to spur further interest in the development
of procedural norms for access to justice in transnational
environmental litigation for both victims of environmental harm and
the companies who seek a fair forum in which to defend themselves.
As developing countries upgrade their judicial systems, the days
when a foreign non conveniens dismissal was the death knell for
claims, no matter how meritorious they might be seem to be, are
fading into the past. Environmental liability disputes will remain
messy and contentious, but they will be a necessary avenue for
seeking redress when regulatory policy fails to prevent significant
harm. They may also serve as a ―bottom up‖ catalyst for the further
development of global environmental liability norms.

120. For Chevron’s perspective, see Chevron, Ecuador Lawsuit—Facts About
Chevron and Texaco in Ecuador, http://www.chevron.com/ecuador/ (last visited
Apr. 27, 2010). For the plaintiff’s perspective, see TrueCostofChevron.com,
Ecuador, http://www.truecostofchevron.com (last visited Apr. 27, 2010).
121. Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act, §§ 1–10, 9C
U.L.A. 392–98 (1982). See also Uniform Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About
The . . . Uniform Transboundary Pollution Reciprocal Access Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-utpraa.asp (last
visited Apr. 27, 2010).
122. Michael I. Jeffrey, Transboundary Pollution and Cross Border Remedies,
18 CAN.-U.S. L. J. 173, 177 (1992).

